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SPEECH
STRENGTHENING WORLD ORDER: REVERSING THE
SLIDE TO ANARCHY
John Norton Moore*
Professor Bilder, Dr. Ringler, ladies and gentlemen:
It is an honor and a pleasure to deliver the Corliss Lamont Lecture
at the University of Wisconsin. My remarks this evening, at one of the
nation's great centers of learning, are dedicated to the importance of
enhanced research and thought about international conflict manage-
ment. They are also dedicated to the proposition that war among na-
tions is not inevitable and that human thought can and will eliminate it
from the face of the Earth.
My remarks, of course, are solely my own and are not those of any
institution with which I am or have been affiliated. The content of these
remarks will be in two related parts:
- first, a summary intellectual map and history of human thought
about war prevention and - second, a new proposal for broadening
East-West dialogue that I call "world-order accountability."
PART I
For more than 2000 years mankind has sought to control the scourge
of war. Though war has not been eliminated, those efforts have been
important in reducing and controlling international violence. And
whatever their success, they provide the intellectual heritage in which
contemporary mankind must work to avoid thermonuclear war and re-
* Walter L. Brown Professor of Law, The University of Virginia School of Law.
Professor Moore has served as Counselor on International Law to the Department of
State, as a United States Ambassador to the Third United Nations Conference on the
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duce international violence. Where that heritage is inadequate there is
no more pressing need than its successful strengthening.
By 1987, efforts to control international violence had produced more
than a dozen principal intellectual approaches. These approaches are
interrelated and might be usefully thought of as separate strands in a
rope of increasing numbers of strands and, hopefully, strength as we
seek to enhance system strengths against war. These principal intellec-
tual strands are norms concerning permissibility of recourse to force;
laws of war, neutrality, and anti-terrorism; institutions and practices
for peaceful settlement of disputes; diplomacy, including negotiation
theory, and "second track diplomacy," personal responsibility for viola-
tion of major conflict management norms (popularly known as "the
Nuremberg principles"'); institutional modes of conflict management
including collective security; arms control, disarmament, confidence
building measures, and neutrality; deterrence, balance of power, and
maintenance of strategic balance; national measures for control of force
and promotion of peace; theories of pacifism and non-violent sanctions;
functionalism, including systems interchange, "people to people" in-
terchange, and education about war or "rationalism"; and systemic the-
ories about war prevention, including linkages between conflict and po-
litical systems.
The historical development of conflict management theory and these
dozen plus strands can most usefully be divided into six periods. You
should bear in mind that these are divisions for heuristic purposes, that
any history of thought does not come neatly divided, and that these
divisions are most certainly fuzzy at the edges. These periods are: the
"just war" period from approximately 335 B.C. to 1800 A.D., the "war
as fact" era from approximately 1800-1918, the early League of Na-
tions2 system from approximately 1919-1925, the Kellogg-Briand Pact
and late League era from approximately 1928-1945, the early United
Nations Charter system from approximately 1945-1958, and the con-
temporary Charter era from approximately 1959 to the present.
1. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL CHARTER; Resolution Affirming the Prin-
ciples of the International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), 1 U.N. GAOR at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946), re-
printed in D. DJONOVICH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 175 (1972). The Inter-
national Law Commission drafted the Principles at the direction of the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations. M. BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE
AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 3-4 (1987).
2. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 1.
3. The Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) for the Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy, Feb. 9, 1929, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S.
57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
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A. THE "JUST WAR" PERIOD
The "just war" approach was essentially a religious-philosophical
doctrine that war was justified if the cause was just. Particularly as
associated with St. Augustine,4 St. Thomas Aquinas 5 and other Catho-
lic thinkers, the focus was on the objectives motivating the use of force.
If the objective was to right a wrong or punish a wrongdoer then the
war was just, subject to certain other qualifications, such as proportion-
ality and state control of violence. Importantly, in this tradition an ag-
gressive war can be a just war as can a defensive war. That is, it is not
necessary for a just war that the other side resort to coercion first.
Moreover, presumably under the tradition, if an aggressive war is just,
then even defense against it would be unjust. Clearly, then, the tradi-
tion of "just war" is in a central respect fundamentally different from
the aggression-defense requirements of contemporary international law
and the United Nations Charter.'
A strength of the "just war" approach is that it does not divorce
order from justice. If force is lawfully used it must be in the service of
a just cause. In addition, it is an on-the-merits attempt at distinguish-
ing permissible from impermissible coercion, and a beginning analysis
of rules for the conduct of hostilities.
Within the context of a powerful and fairly monolithic church in the
Western world which was influential in deciding the justice of a cause,
the "just war" doctrine was not as unremarkable as it might appear
today. In fact, apparently there is at least one recorded instance where
Spanish authorities, before beginning a war, consulted the clergy on its
justice. The doctrine, then, had some foundation in actual state prac-
tice. Moreover, the sanction was said to be a real one in the hereafter,
and strong religious beliefs made this a meaningful threat.
With the rise of the nation-state and the coming of the Reformation,
however, the power of a once monolithic Church began to wane. As it
did so, the real disadvantages of the approach became even more evi-
dent. First, there were no objective criteria as to a just or unjust war
and there was no central decisionmaker to make the determination. As
a result, nations were free to interpret the justness of their own cause
4. See Hartigan, Saint Augustine on War and Killing:. The Problem of the Inno-
cent, 27 J. HIsT. IDEAS 195, 195 (1965) (discussing Saint Augustine's writings concern-
ing the right to wage war).
5. See J. TOOKE, THE JUST VAR IN AQUINAS AND GROTIUS 1 (1965) (discussing
Aquinas' and Grotius' approaches to the Just War doctrine); AQUINAS: SELECTED PO-
LITICAL WRITINGS 1 (A. D'Entrenes, ed. 1948) (containing the major political writings
of Aquinas).
6. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
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and did so with predictable results. In fact, theorists were increasingly
concerned about the problem of a war which is just on both sides. One
Spanish theorist, Francisco de Victoria, ingeniously solved this by the
doctrine of "invincible ignorance," reminiscent of some of our current
legal fictions. Thus he maintained that, although there could only be
one objectively just side, invincible ignorance may lead one to believe
that his side is just and thus excuse his conduct.7 Second, and most
importantly, the "just war" theory failed to focus on the destructive-
ness of force as a strategy of change. The focus was on the justice of
the cause, not on the inefficiency of coerced solutions or the injustice of
widespread devastation. Third, there was little recognition of the need
for procedural or institutional techniques for avoiding or controlling
war, although toward the end of this period Samuel Pufendorf8 did ex-
hort princes to try a conference, arbitration or even the lot before
resorting to arms.
These inherent difficulties with the "just war" theory, compounded
by the Reformation and the breakup of the monolithic church, drained
much of its intellectual vigor and power to influence conduct. It is
probably more accurate to say, however, that it was pushed aside by a
more vigorous set of ideas than that it was totally abandoned. In fact,
the just war tradition has continued to be the approach of many Catho-
lic and Protestant theologians to problems of conflict management.
B. THE PERIOD OF "WAR AS FACT"
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rise of the na-
tion-state and theories of absolute sovereignty began to push aside the
just war approach. The realpolitik of Clausewitz and Machiavelli and
notions of sovereignty transformed war from an instrument conceived
for justice to an instrument of national policy. Thus, Carl von Clause-
witz wrote, in On War: "[W]ar is an instrument of policy; it must nec-
essarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale; the conduct
of war, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up
the sword in place of the pen. ... " Simultaneously, theorists began to
differentiate between moral or natural law principles and positive inter-
national law reflecting state behavior. Writing in The Law of Nations
7. de Victoria, The Second Relectio on the Law of War, in F. DE VICTORIA,
RELECTIONES THEOLOGICAE (1557), reprinted in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
163, 176-78 (J. Scott ed. 1934).
8. See generally S. PUFENDORF, ELEMENTA JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI
Duo (1660); S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OcTo (1672); S.
PUFENDORF, DE STATU IMPERIl GERMANICI (1667).
9. C. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 610 (M. Howard & P. Paret, eds. 1976).
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in 1758, de Vattel emphasized the distinction between natural law
judgments, which distinguish just wars, and positive international law,
which accounts wars just on both sides since nations are equal and in-
dependent and cannot claim a right of judgment over each other."0
The central tenet of the "war as fact" period is that since each state
is sovereign, international law cannot regulate the resort to war. War is
a "metajuristic phenomenon," an event outside the range and control of
law. The existence of war is simply a question of fact giving rise to
neutral rights and duties and the law of warfare to mitigate destruc-
tiveness of the conflict, and with which international law can properly
be concerned.
This period represented a "cop-out" in making the necessary judg-
ments between permissible and impermissible coercion. Things had
moved from bad to worse. It was not all bad, however, as this period
witnessed a focus of concern on the rules for conducting warfare, on
the regulation of force short of war such as reprisals, and, in the 1818-
1822 Concert of Europe system"1 and Hague Conferences of 189912
and 1907,13 the beginning of an international conference system con-
cerned with war-peace issues. For the first time it began to be recog-
10. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758).
11. See F. WILSON, THE ORIGINS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT 135 (1928) (stating
that the Concert of Europe system was a new device in the prevention of war that
sought to give, through conferences, the counsels of the great power nations the sim-
plicity of a single state).
12. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 392, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, U.S. TREATIES 201b (1899)
[hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899]; Convention on the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Convention for the Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, T.S. No. 396; Convention Prohibiting Launching of Pro-
jectiles and Explosives from Balloons, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839, T.S. No. 393.
13. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907,
32 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907]; Convention Re-
specting the Limitations of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract
Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537; Convention Relative to the Opening
of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538; Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Con-
vention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540; Convention Relative to the
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S.
No. 541; Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542; Convention for the Adaption to Maritime War-
fare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No.
543; Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the
Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544; Conven-
tion Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545; Convention Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles
and Explosives From Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. No. 546.
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nized that nation states must act in concert to promote their common
interest in world order. The Hague Conferences, in fact, foreshadowed
the League of Nations, as the participants promoted rules concerning
the law of war, established such dispute settlement machinery as the
Permanent Court of Arbitration1" and, on the substantive side, even
prohibited the use of force for the collection of international debts. The
latter part of this period also witnessed a rise of pacifism and rational-
ism as theories of war avoidance. That is, a belief that war could be
avoided if enough individuals would agree not to fight and that educa-
tion about the irrationality of resort to war would prevent its use. Paci-
fism, of course, was strongly rooted in early Christian thought prior to
the rise of the "just war" tradition.
To summarize, although the "war as fact" period deemphasized
judgments concerning the initiation of major coercion, it began to de-
velop a framework for appraisal of minor coercion, greatly accelerated
development of the laws of war (partly in the important 1907 Hague
Conventions"), introduced international machinery for peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, began a tradition of international cooperation on
war/peace issues, introduced in the Concert of Europe system," a con-
cern with maintenance of the balance of power, and introduced peace
activism focused at the time on pacifism, rationalism, and world feder-
alism. Toward the end of the period-and on the eve of World War
I-its central intellectual focus was on mechanisms and procedures for
peaceful settlements of disputes.
C. THE PERIOD OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The nineteenth and early twentieth century .experience with interna-
tional organizations combined with the worldwide revulsion at the terri-
ble destructiveness of World War I, to end the period of unlimited na-
tional discretion to resort to war. The League of Nations was founded
in 1920 as an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles17 which con-
cluded World War I. The Covenant to the League was essentially a
response to what was widely believed to be a war by accident. If, in the
era of nation-states, war could arise by accident without anyone really
14. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 12, arts. 20-29 (establishing the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration).
15. See supra note 13 (listing the 1907 Hague Conventions).
16. See generally F. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952)
(noting the 19th century growth of efforts to abolish war through consultations such as
the Concert of Europe); see also F. WILSON, supra note 11, at 135 (discussing an
evolving focus on the rules for conducting warfare).
17. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919.
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wanting war, the answer seemed to be to subject nation-states to delay
and procedures for peaceful settlement before permitting resort to war.
Under the Covenant, then, the lawfulness of resort to war was primar-
ily defined in procedural terms. The lawfulness of war did not depend
solely on the justness of one's cause but rather on compliance with pro-
cedural standards. Thus, war was illegal if (a) the dispute was not sub-
mitted to third-party adjudication or council action; (b) the declarant
did not wait at least three months after the award before going to war;
or (c) the declarant warred against a complying state.
The major weakness of the League lay in the skeptical attitude of
nation-states toward it, and their continuing determination to indepen-
dently pursue their own national interests as they perceived them. The
failure of the United States to join despite President Wilson's leading
role in creating the League was perhaps symptomatic of a deeper mal-
aise. When William Allen White was asked to write an article for
Harper's Magazine on "What Does Kansas Think of the League of
Nations," he was reported to have replied: "Kansas does not think of
the League of Nations." '
Moreover, in keeping with the earlier emphasis on sovereign discre-
tion, decisions of the Council had to be unanimous, and in practice this
greatly weakened any possibility of meaningful collective security. And
thirdly, the emphasis on procedural and institutional checks on resort
to war was not clearly balanced by substantive judgment about what
kinds of coercion were permissible and impermissible apart from proce-
dural compliance.
Whatever the cause, the League proved incapable of stopping the
deliberate aggression of Japan in China,19 Italy in Ethiopia,20 and Ger-
many in Europe.21 The principal disarmament conference of the
League, held in 1932,22 likewise proved incapable of controlling an es-
calating arms build-up driven by Axis determination.
18. White authored fifteen books including biographies of three presidents. See.
e.g., W. WHITE, CALVIN COOLIDGE, THE MAN WHO IS PRESIDENT (1925); W. WHITE,
THE MAN, His TIMES & His TASK (1928); see generally Milestones, TIMIE, Feb. 7,
1944, at 82 (describing White as a famous Kansas author who edited the Emporia
Gazette for over 49 years, during which it became the country's most quoted
newspaper).
19. See J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 36 (1958) (noting Japan's
military expansion into Manchuria as one of many instances of aggression exhibiting
the weakness of the League).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Feb. 1932, re-
printed in THE MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATiONS XIII, No. 2, at 35-
38 (reporting on the first Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments).
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The period of the League did, however, introduce important new
controls on the first use of lethal chemical weapons as embodied in the
1925 Geneva Protocol. 23 This period also made further progress in the
laws of war, particularly the 1929 Convention on the Treatment of
Prisoners of War.24 It introduced the concept of criminal accountability
for violation of certain conflict management norms, in the abortive
Leipzig trials,2 5 and developed at the 1921-22 Washington2 6 and 1930
London Naval Conferences 27 a model for arms control negotiations
based on maintenance of the strategic balance through numerical limits
on major weapons systems-in this case battleships and certain other
naval ships.
The withdrawal of Japan in 1935 from the Washington-London
agreements, 28 however, reflected the same international reality that had
doomed the League. It is a sad commentary on the American experi-
ence during this period that despite Wilson's lead in establishing the
League and seeking to promote international relations based on law,
American public opinion was strongly isolationist, and as a result
America-along with the other democracies-lost an opportunity for
deterrence that might have prevented World War II. Indeed, Churchill
referred to World War II as "the unnecessary war" because of this lost
opportunity at deterrence. It should be recalled that Roosevelt's famous
"quarantine" speech in 1937, in which he called for a "quarantine" of
aggressor nations, engendered a negative reaction in American public
opinion. 2 The winds of war were spreading the flames in Asia and Eu-
23. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061.
24. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47
Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 836, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
25. Judgment of the German Supreme Court in the Case of Lieutenants Dittmar
and Boldt (The Llandovery Castle Case), reprinted in THE LAW OF WAR - A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 868-82 (L. Friedman, ed. 1972).
26. Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, United States-
Great Britain, 43 Stat. 1655, T.S. No. 671 [hereinafter Washington Naval
Conference].
27. Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, Apr. 22, 1930,
United States-Great Britain, 46 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 830 [hereinafter London Naval
Conference].
28. See Depriving Japan of Mandates is Favored by League Majority, But Action
is Far Off, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1935, at 15 (discussing the questions raised by the
League of Nations Council as a result of Japan's withdrawal); Japan's Chair is Re-
moved, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1935, at 4 (noting that Japan lost its chair at the Council
of the League of Nation upon Japan's withdrawal from the League after a fifteen year
membership).
29. See THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT sec. 128
(1937) (quoting the text of Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech).
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rope but American public opinion sought refuge behind the oceans.
D. THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT30 AND THE LATE LEAGUE ERA
The lack of a normative, substantive emphasis of the League was
remedied in 1928 by the controversial Treaty for the Renunciation of
War.31 This Treaty, popularly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or
"Pact of Paris," prohibited war for the solution of international contro-
versies or as an instrument of national policy.32 It was clear from the
Conference discussions that defensive use of force was excluded from
this ban.
As a conflict management tool the Pact of Paris was roundly criti-
cized for unrealistically creating expectations that war would be con-
trolled. But in the history of thought about permissible coercion, it was
momentous. This Pact filled what had become widely known as a "gap
in the Covenant" (see above) that permitted war. But the Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact did far more than fill the famous "gap in the Covenant." It
reflected a fundamental shift in the history of conflict management that
may have been the single most important intellectual leap in that his-
tory. The focus was no longer whether war was "just" or whether cer-
tain procedural requirements designed to prevent accidental war had
been met. Rather, the focus was squarely on whether a use of force was
aggressive and thus illegal or defensive and thus lawful. Major coercion
could no longer be used as an instrument of national policy but (with
some exceptions) only to protect against an illegal use of force. Now
mankind had begun to at least collectively understand that the use of
force was simply too destructive as a modality of major change in the
international system.
E. THE PERIOD OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
At the conclusion of World War II the Allies met at San Francisco,
in the words of the preamble of the Charter, "to save succeeding gener-
ations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind ... .-33 Thus was ushered in the period of the
United Nations. Basically, the Charter built on the two great strands of
the League period: first, the substantive requirements of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact outlawing war except in defense, and second, the principle
30. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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of collective defense from article 16 of the League. 4
The Charter, however, substantially strengthened the structure of the
League period. Since the Kellogg-Briand pact had condemned "re-
course to war," 35 it was not clear that forceful reprisals and force short
of war, which had been the focus of international law in the "war as
fact" period, were prohibited. The Charter closed this loophole by
changing the operative language from "war" to "the threat or use of
force,"36 although the permissible limits of force short of the article
2(4) "threshold" is still debated. And on the procedural side, the U.N.
envisioned a strengthened Security Council.3 7 Henceforth, collective se-
curity-even if only the collective security of the big five powers at the
end of World War II-would be substituted for unilateral action. The
Charter also greatly strengthened the role of the Secretary-General38
and it established an International Court of Justice39 as an integral
part of the United Nations system.
The major difficulty with the Charter structure is, of course, now
34. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16. Article 16 states:
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenant
under articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an
act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the
prohibition of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the cove-
nant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nation-
als of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several
Governments concerned with what effective military naval, or air force the Mem-
bers of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to
protect the covenants of the League. The Members of the League agree, further,
that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic mea-
sures which are taken under this article, in order to minimize the loss and incon-
venience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support
one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by
the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford
passage through their territory to the forces of any Members of the League
which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may
be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council
concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League
represented thereon.
Id.
35. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra, note 3, 94 L.N.T.S., at 65.
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. This paragraph now states that "All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.





history. The wartime cooperation between the major powers broke
down over the cold war-as may have been anticipated by at least
some national leaders when the Charter was formally agreed upon. As
a result, the article 4340 agreement to specify national forces to be
made available to the Security Council at its request, was never imple-
mented4' and the Security Council entered the frustrating period of the
veto.
F. THE CONTEMPORARY CHARTER ERA
Today international relations are shaped by several overriding sys-
temic conditions. These include the East-West rivalry, the nuclear con-
dition and a growth in secret warfare below the nuclear threshold rang-
ing from state-sponsored terrorism through protracted national
liberation struggles.
This period has witnessed an explosion in newer theories of conflict
management, many loosely grouped under an emerging discipline of
"peace studies." These newer approaches include negotiation theory,
second track diplomacy, non-violent sanctions (as opposed to pacifism),
an enhancement of interest in functionalism and rationalism and a
study of "pathways to war" or conflict scenarios. Not surprisingly, be-
cause of the failure of deterrence prior to World War II and the exis-
tence of the cold war, deterrence has served as a central component of
governmental policies in this contemporary Charter era, although it has
been focused on nuclear and regular conventional war rather than the
newer mode of "secret warfare" characteristic of the contemporary era.
In addition, all of the earlier strands continue to play a role. The popu-
lar focus (as well as the focus of East-West dialogue), however, be-
cause of the nuclear condition, overwhelmingly has been nuclear arms
control.
PART II
A. A PROPOSAL FOR BROADENING EAST-WEST DIALOGUE
For a quarter century the focus of East-West dialogue has been arms
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. This paragraph states that:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
Id.
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1.
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control, indeed primarily control of strategic nuclear weapons. That
process has produced achievements recognized by all including the
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty,4 the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty,43 the SALT agreements, 44 and the recent INF Treaty.
Whatever the success of this process, the potential of nuclear Armaged-
don suggests that nuclear arms control should and will remain an im-
portant focus of East-West dialogue.
A powerful case can be made, however, that this near total focus
with negotiations concerning strategic nuclear arms had both failed to
prevent a deterioration in world order and paradoxically may even have
lessened chances of an agreement on nuclear arms. It is common
knowledge that we end the quarter century of SALT/START/Geneva
talks with more than double the number of deliverable warheads on all
sides. The conventional military balance in Europe seems as unstable as
when core arms talks began, and - prior to the recent INF Treaty -
a new destabilizing element had been added in massive Soviet deploy-
ment of triple warhead SS-20 intermediate range and newer shorter
range nuclear missiles and a more restrained NATO46 response with
ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II IRBM de-
ployment. Despite recurrent episodes of d6tente - and more recently
perestroika in general - tension between the United States and the
Soviet Union has remained as high. Most ominously, the quarter cen-
tury has produced a dramatic increase in terrorism, guerrilla warfare
and what has widely become known as "low-intensity" or "secret" war-
fare. It was also a period that produced the Vietnam and Korean Wars,
the fourth and fifth most serious in American history in terms of casu-
alties. Sadly, although there are a few recent signs of improvement,
this period also seems to be witnessing an accelerating deterioration in
institutions for the maintenance of world order, such as the United Na-
tions, the International Court of Justice, the Organization of American
States,47 and even the democratic alliance systems, as with the decline
42. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313. T.l.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
43. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968, United Kingdom-United
States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
44. Interim Agreement, May 26, 1972, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504.
45. Treaty On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range
Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, United States - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988).
46. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No.
1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
47. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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of first SEATO48 and then ANZUS.' 9
Given this record of world order problems outstripping the important
but modest record of East-West dialogue focused on nuclear arms con-
trol, it may be prudent to examine whether that dialogue should be
broadened to include issues beyond arms control. I believe the case is
strong that the United States, and the democratic nations in general,
should carefully broaden the range of East-West dialogue to include a
variety of issues central both to world order and a context permitting
more successful arms control. This broadened dialogue might be
termed "world peace accountability" talks in the interest of a political
concept that could obtain broad support within the democracies. Before
turning, however, to the possible substance and procedure of such an
approach let us briefly examine the weaknesses of the current central
focus on nuclear arms control. Their discussion is emphatically not an
argument against the importance of nuclear arms control.
History teaches that every generation searches for a political holy
grail for the urgently needed human goal of elimination of war. Such
ideas usually embody an important truth and may or may not become
part of the central myth system of their political societies. Sadly, how-
ever, there is not likely to be a single holy grail for the achievement of
stable peace. War almost certainly is multi-caused, with causes varying
by types and periods. Like another human scourge, cancer, it may
never have a single cure but may depend on greater human leadership
across a range of more than a dozen important strands in conflict
management.
As we have seen during the early nineteenth century much intellec-
tual thought focused on promulgating pacifism as the solution to war.
From the turn of the century until the establishment of the League of
Nations, the focus of thought on war prevention became the promotion
of third party dispute settlement machinery for resolution of interna-
tional disputes. Unlike pacifism, this became the centerpiece of Ameri-
can and European efforts at war prevention for more than two decades
with the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 0 the
Permanent Court of International Justice,5 and more than 120 bilat-
48. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S.
No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28 (entered into force on Feb. 19, 1955). The Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty was signed September 8, 1954, by the governments of Aus-
tralia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and
the United States. Id. On June 30, 1977, in Bangkok, SEATO was formally dissolved.
49. Security Treaty, Sept. 1, 1951, Australia-New Zealand-United States, 3 U.S.T.
3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493.
50. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 12.
51. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 14. The Permanent Court of International
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eral arbitration, "cooling-off," and fact-finding treaties. The League of
Nations and the United Nations focused on the hope that collective
security would end aggressive war, yet neither organization could
wholly transcend the real-world reluctance of states and the realities of
contending world order systems.
Not surprisingly, the clear failure to deter Hitler as the core of
World War II coupled with the destructive potential of nuclear weap-
ons has focused world attention since World War II on deterrence and
on the control of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms control, as the central
preoccupation of East-West dialogue, has much more thoroughly cap-
tured both public expectations and official policy across political lines
than any prior focus on a means of war avoidance. While meaningful
arms control that contributes to strategic stability is unquestionably of
great importance, it is increasingly open to question whether such a
focus, to the virtual exclusion of a variety of additional approaches to
conflict avoidance, is the most effective means to enhanced world order
and even arms control itself.
A preoccupation with nuclear arms control to the exclusion of other
important strands in conflict management may have costs both in over-
emphasizing arms control and underemphasizing other important world
order principles.
While it may be paradoxical to speak of overemphasis of nuclear
arms control as a centerpiece of East-West dialogue when no core
agreement on such arms control has yet been reached, in several impor-
tant respects there may be costs of such an emphasis for conflict man-
agement itself. First, we should realize that arms control is not the core
of the problem between East and West. As Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
recently reminded us in the Winter 1987 issue of The Washington
Quarterly,
geopolitical and ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet
Union are the main cause of the hostility and tension in the U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions. Competition in arms, both strategic and conventional, is the consequence
of that condition, not its cause. Hence, it is a mistake to make a fetish out of
arms control or to make it the central facet of U.S.-Soviet relations."2
Justice was an intergovernmental institution, established under article 14 of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations, with the task of examining "all disputes of an interna-
tional character submitted thereto by the Parties" and of giving "[a]dvisory opinions
on all disputes and issues presented by the Council or Assembly of the League of Na-
tions ...... Id. Forty-four member states of the League adopted the Statute of the
Permanent Court on December 13, 1920. Id. The Court began its work on December
15, 1922 in the Hague and ceased to exist formally on December 31, 1945.
52. Brzezinski, National Strategy and Arms Control, 10 WASH. Q. 5, 5 (1987).
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The same point is also made by the converse illustration that despite
the ability of the French and British to devastate American cities with
nuclear weapons, few are seriously perturbed about the need for the
United States to limit French and British systems. Thus, to the extent
that over-preoccupation with arms control causes us to neglect more
serious causes of strain, it may have costs for conflict management
itself.
Second, despite the unquestioned need for genuine arms control in
enhancing strategic stability, sadly history does not tell us that earlier
such efforts, for example, in the London53 and Washington Naval Con-
ferences,54 were able to prevent World War II. That is, it would seem a
mistake to put all of our conflict management eggs in a single basket
not clearly linked with inevitable success in war avoidance. In the real
world our current expectations about arms control as a holy grail of
war avoidance may be no more accurate than similar expectations
about pacifism and third party dispute settlement that failed to prevent
four of the five most deadly wars in American history.
Third, an overemphasis on nuclear arms control can ignore and even
exacerbate a crucial strategic problem for the West, that of the historic
imbalance between Warsaw Pact 5 and NATO conventional forces in
the European theatre. The West has, since World War II, relied on
linkage to the Western nuclear deterrent at the central strategic front
as the deterrent to prevent conventional attacks in Europe (however
tenuous in an age of rough equivalence and massive theatre nuclear
systems). One cost of preoccupation with central nuclear systems may
have been relative neglect by the West of the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR)56 negotiations to restore conventional bal-
ance in Europe. Although initially part of a dual package with the So-
viet-sought Helsinki agreements,57 Helsinki has thrived while MBFR
has languished. Similarly, because of preoccupation with nuclear arms
as a separate focus, the West has failed to link Soviet no-first-use-of-
nuclear-weapons proposals with progress in Warsaw Pact conventional
force reductions in MBFR, which is, of course, the core problem for the
West in such proposals. Moreover, as the Europeans' reactions to the
53. London Naval Conference, supra note 27.
54. Washington Naval Conference, supra note 26.
55. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact),
May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3.
56. See Stanley, Conventional Arms Control in Europe, 7 SAIS REV. 23
(1987)(discussing early negotiations among NATO and the Warsaw Pact since 1973
on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and its present status).
57. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, 14 I.L.M. 1292,
73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
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prospect of deep cuts in central nuclear systems and a partial
decoupling of American intermediate nuclear systems at the Reykjavik
Summit show, Europeans are quite aware of their continuing vulnera-
bility from the conventional imbalance and their resulting strategic di-
lemma. 58 Bearing in mind that two out of the five most destructive
wars in American history, Korea and Vietnam, have been fought since
the advent of nuclear weapons and without their use, we should also
remember it is very important to deter conventional as well as nuclear
conflicts. Because of the understandable preoccupation with nuclear
weapons there may be a widespread underemphasis of the horrors of
modern conventional war and the importance of preventing it.
Fourth, there may also be popular overexpectation as to what arms
control-even dramatic arms control-may achieve. Arms control is of
great importance in seeking to enhance stability and hopefully moving
to lower levels of forces on all sides while building systems confidence.
But it can also be oversold. The most far-reaching proposals currently
being considered between the United States and the Soviet Union
would still leave 5,000 nuclear warheads targeted at both sides, and
getting to such deep reductions means solving verification, compliance
and control of future technology issues not yet resolved on a far lesser
scale.59 Reductions to numbers of weapons less than sufficient to devas-
tate society as we know it may simply be impossible consistent with any
likely breakthroughs in verification, control of future technologies and
compliance. In this connection, remember that proposals in the 1960s
for sweeping disarmament as opposed to arms control6" have been
largely abandoned as governments have come face-to-face with the re-
ality that by the mid-1960s we could no longer verify the number of
warheads produced worldwide.
Fifth, accepting nuclear arms control as the centerpiece of East-West
dialogue may have certain non-reciprocal costs for the democracies in
the overall East-West struggle. Democracies are properly responsive to
the wishes of the people and there is a risk that focus on arms control
58. See generally Yost, The Reykjavik Summit and European Security, 7 SAIS
REV. 1 (1987) (discussing the four main topics of concern to Western Europe discussed
at Reykjavik: the tentative agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); the
proposals for strategic force limitations; the goal of complete nuclear disarmament; and
conflicting views on future limitations on ballistic missile defense).
59. See Hildreth, U.S. and Soviet Arms Control Proposals, March 1985-May
1987, 8 CONG. RES. SERVICE REV. 10 (1987) (describing briefly the proposals for stra-
tegic arms reduction, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space issues).
60. See Stanley, supra note 56, at 25 (discussing the move by the United States
and NATO allies in the mid-1960s to discuss plans for Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a counter to Soviet Union propos-
als for a European Conference to discuss disarmament in Europe).
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may become focus on unilateral restraint. If political expectations for
war avoidance center on a forever elusive core arms control agreement
some may assume that unilateral restraint or reductions in strategic
systems may be just as effective as mutual arms control. Yet wherever
strategic instability is already a problem, such unilateral actions could
dangerously undercut stability and deterrence and, paradoxically, may
also reduce the chances for arms control. Many would urge that Amer-
ican arms programs are part of an action-reaction cycle contributing to
the arms problem and that there is ample room for unilateral restraint.
Many others would as sincerely urge that American policies toward
development and deployment of new strategic systems in relation to the
momentum of Soviet programs have skirted dangerously close to under-
mining strategic stability and deterrence. Similarly, a single focus on
strategic systems of both East and West plays to the morally bankrupt
position that East and West are equivalent risks to world stability. The
fundamental issue is not perceived as willingness to abide by funda-
mental norms of the United Nations Charter prohibiting aggressive
war61 and supporting self-determination, 2 but rather the simple exis-
tence of equivalent nuclear arsenals. Historically a core problem of de-
mocracies in war avoidance has been perceiving and deterring radical
regime and totalitarian aggression. The widespread resort to secret
warfare in the contemporary international system exacerbates these
tendencies in the democracies. A focus of negotiation that centers on
achieving rough equivalence in strategic nuclear systems certainly does
nothing to assist populations in democracies to understand the real and
quite different threats posed by totalitarian and radical regimes. This
might be summarized by saying that there is no high ground-as right-
fully there should be-for the democracies when the almost exclusive
focus of dialogue is the number of strategic delivery vehicles or
warheads.
Finally, an overemphasis on nuclear arms negotiations may undercut
serious efforts at progress on other world order dimensions. While re-
cent United States-Soviet Summit agendas have been broadened to in-
clude "regional" issues such as Afghanistan, Central America and im-
portant human rights issues, 63 the nuclear arms issues have
overwhelmed these issues as illustrated by the worldwide media focus
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. This paragraph denounces the use of aggression
as a means of international dispute resolutions. Id.
62. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
63. See Renge, The Other Issues on the Mini-Suninit Agenda, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 13, 1986, at 1 (noting that while arms control was the big issue
at the summit, human rights and regional conflicts were also on the table).
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at Reykjavik on these arms issues to the virtual exclusion of the agenda
issues on regional conflicts and human rights.
Just as a preoccupation with nuclear arms control may have costs
associated with overemphasizing nuclear arms issues, so may it impose
costs in underemphasizing other important world order strands. First, it
may divert attention from a range of non-nuclear but extremely impor-
tant arms control issues. Central among these is the need to address
the fundamental strategic dilemma for NATO of restoring a conven-
tional balance by reductions in Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces. Almost all
NATO political leaders have recognized that NATO is unlikely to
make the political/economic choices necessary to balance Soviet-War-
saw Pact conventional superiority. It is this real-world political unwill-
ingness to match Warsaw Pact conventional forces that has produced
flexible response and two-track intermediate nuclear strategies. Sur-
prisingly little attention has been paid by Western leaders or Western
public opinion to means of increasing pressure on the Soviet Union for
unilateral conventional force reduction as an alternative or supplement
to Western strategy. The result has been a hard-line Soviet stance in
the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks and exceedingly lim-
ited progress in these protracted negotiations. Similarly, little attention
has been paid to limitations on conventional arms in Central and South
America.
Second, it is likely that the preoccupation with nuclear arms control
and nuclear deployment decisions is one factor in an astonishing West-
ern underemphasis on fundamental international legal norms prohibit-
ing aggressive attack, whether overt or covert. A root condition of
world order is a willingness of all nations to forego the use of military
force as a modality of major change of the international system,
whatever the differences between political systems and however intense
the competition in other spheres. This principle is embodied as a core
standard of world order by the United Nations Charter 4 and may be
the most important human insight about war prevention in 2000 years
of human thought about the subject. That is, aggressive attack,
whether open or secret, is prohibited and the test of the lawfulness of
major coercion against another state largely rests on whether it is act-
ing in defense against this impermissible aggression. 5 As an important
companion principle, every nation has a right to its own self-determina-
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.




tion and choice of political system.66 Yet today little is heard about
these principles. Even more seriously, the core contemporary threat to
world order is secret aggressive attack through state supported terror-
ism, coups and guerilla struggles. This secret warfare, while a major
concern, has produced a startlingly small focus on the impermissibility
of such attack as a deterrence method to assist in deterring such attack,
and it has made it increasingly difficult for the democracies to accu-
rately perceive threats.
Finally, there are a host of other strands in war prevention deserving
of attention and at least some of their relative neglect may stem from
the current preoccupation with nuclear arms control. The United Na-
tions has deteriorated markedly since its formation as a serious body
for conflict management. While there are likely to be no quick fixes,
efforts to strengthen the organization deserve more focused Western
attention. Similarly, while the effort to have the World Court deal ef-
fectively with ongoing wars seems misplaced and likely only to damage
the institution, greater attention should be accorded to ways of
strengthening the Court for the resolution of disputes, such as oceans-
boundary disputes, where the Court may make a significant overall
contribution to the total problem of international conflict management.
Enhanced efforts at diplomatic solutions to intractable conflict may in
some settings yield dividends, as the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy and
the Camp David Accords67 have illustrated. Is there, for example, an
opportunity for American shuttle diplomacy in seeking to resolve the
Greece-Turkey Aegean68 problem? And newer modes of thinking about
negotiations, as well as second track diplomacy involving citizen-to-citi-
zen exchange, could make a contribution to enhancing diplomacy and
strengthening leadership perspectives for peace. We should remember
that just as there is likely to be no single cause of war (though some
causes such as a failure of deterrence may be of particular recurring
significance) there is no single route to peace. Certainly the effort to
pursue one admittedly important and central route should not contrib-
ute to the neglect of others.
B. A PROPOSED NEw APPROACH: WORLD PEACE ACCOUNTABILITY
Having briefly reviewed some of the problems associated with a con-
66. Id. art. 2, para. 1 (declaring respect for the equal sovereignty of each state).
67. Camp David Agreements, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Israel-United States, 17
I.L.M. 1463, reprinted in The Camp David Summit, DEP'T ST. PUB. 8954 (1978).
68. See A Nasty Squall in the Aegean, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1987, at 38-39
(discussing the recurring and seemingly insoluble Greek-Turkish dispute over Aegean
Sea oil).
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temporary search for peace focused almost exclusively on nuclear arms
control, is there an alternative? I believe that there is, that it offers
better opportunity for enhanced international conflict management,
that it offers substantial advantages for the democracies, paradoxically
that it even offers enhanced long term potential for meaningful arms
control, and finally that it is surprisingly obvious once we transcend our
understandable preoccupation with nuclear weapons.
The alternative is quite simple. The West should broaden the East-
West dialogue and the international public debate to include the full
range of strands in conflict management, but giving particular attention
not only to arms control but also to the fundamental underpinning of
world order that aggressive attack is impermissible, whether overt or
covert. Arms control efforts within such a broadened focus should also
be broadened to include an enhanced focus on the conventional bal-
ances in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
This approach is emphatically not an argument against the impor-
tance of effective nuclear arms control. Nor is it even an argument for
negotiating linkage between arms control and non-arms control issues.
It is a recognition that the range of East-West concerns is far broader
than nuclear arms control alone and that there is almost certainly a
major long-term milieu linkage between the state of East-West rela-
tions and the prospects of effective arms control. It is also a recognition
that the cornerstone of world order is acceptance by all nations of the
fundamental Charter prohibition of aggressive attack,69 whether overt
or covert. Any approach that neglects this latter principle, particularly
in a world threatened by expanding secret warfare, is severely stunted
and may inevitably destroy prospects for serious arms control.
In recent years there has been increasing understanding that engage-
ment beyond nuclear arms control is essential for peace. As such, there
has begun a new realism in United Nations deliberations (anything else
is to doom the UN to irrelevance), and summit meetings have been
broadened to include "regional"70 and "human rights" 1 issues. In my
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
70. See, e.g.,Wren, Afghanistan May be Topic in Iceland, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1986, at A3 (reporting that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze expected a
discussion of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan at the Iceland Summit in October,
1986); Gwertzman, U.S. Stressing Human Rights and Regional Issues, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 10, 1986, at A12 (stating that American officials noted progress in a number of
issues other than arms control, including regional issues, as indicia of success at the
Iceland Summit); N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1986, at A13 (reporting that regional issues
are one of five issues areas Reagan and Gorbachev were to discuss at Iceland Summit).
See also G. WEIHMILLER, U.S.-SOVIET SuMMITs: AN AGREEMENT OF EAST-WEST Di-




judgment, however, these are but first halting steps in revising a pat-
tern as entrenched as only widely shared "conventional wisdom" can
make it. Additional steps that might be taken to broaden the dialogue
and public perceptions about effective ways to promote peace are
legion.
First, a new approach should have a conceptualization that will en-
courage broader thinking about its realization. A concept of "regional"
talks will not inspire democratic opinion, however sound. Rather a
broader conceptualization is needed rooted in fundamental principles of
world order. Just as the conceptualization about a "human rights" dia-
logue has developed an important and correct following I believe that a
focus on what might be termed "world-order accountability" or
"world-peace accountability" offers substantial benefit for enhanced
global understanding. Democratic nations should be perceived as, and
should be, actively pursuing peace in all its dimensions, not just nuclear
arms control. And most importantly they should be perceived as pursu-
ing a principle of world order-rooted in democratic belief-that overt
and covert aggression should be strongly and continuously condemned
in international relations and that self-determination and human rights
must be respected. Indeed, it is a strange paradox of the current East-
West dialogue that human rights issues, certainly of great importance,
have a position of prominence, yet world-order as a generic issue does
not. The West probably has only limited ability (although the effort
and limited results are of great importance) to enhance human rights
in totalitarian and radical regimes. But surely the West should insist on
a cessation of aggressive attacks as a critical ingredient of world order.
Strangely here, where the ability to influence and deter may be higher,
the effort by the West is less visible.
Second, the newer approach should be implemented across a broad
range of fora. Thus, it should be pursued actively with American allies
in diplomatic and heads-of-states meetings going beyond the previous
narrow focus, however useful, in past terrorism communiqu6s. In addi-
tion to specific conflicts and issues the focus should include a return to
the basics of democratic beliefs against aggressive attack and for self-
determination and human rights. Similarly, it should be pursued across
71. See, e.g., Dole, The Summit's Promise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at A35 (ar-
guing that human rights are as deserving of discussion at summit conference at Rey-
kjavik as arms control issues); N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at AI0 (reporting that Secre-
tary of State George Shultz said that human rights would be high on the agenda at the
Iceland Summit); N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1986, at Al (noting that status of Soviet Jews
emerged as a central topic of discussion at the Reykjavik Summit). See also M.
COOPER, U.S. SoviEr SUMMITRY (1985) (discussing recent summit meetings).
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a range of bilateral and limited multilateral East-West fora, including
summits, the CSCE (Helsinki) process,7 12 and possibly a new United
States proposal for a dedicated East-West negotiating track on enhanc-
ing world peace. An obvious place for a beginning would be future
Helsinki review conferences and spin-off conferences such as the re-
cently concluded Stockholm Conference on Security in Europe.7 3 In ad-
dition, the United States should actively pursue the new approach
within the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO,
ANZUS, and the OAS, and with third world countries through a more
active diplomatic focus on the problems and requirements of world
peace. In this connection we should tirelessly emphasize the twin prin-
ciples of prohibition of aggression and the right of effective defense
against aggressive attack and we should fully expose and focus atten-
tion on the growing threat of secret warfare. We should strongly and
consistently introduce the new theme in American and democratic na-
tions public affairs diplomacy. One heuristic device in this connection
might be a new country-by-country world order or "peace" accounta-
bility report to parallel the yearly human rights report from the State
Department. And we should seek to enhance Western public affairs re-
porting in these themes in general, for example, with coordinated white
papers on secret war and individual terror attacks. In the long run,
enhanced effectiveness of such a new approach by the democracies will
depend on citizen support around the world and particularly within the
democracies.
Finally, a new approach, while not downgrading nuclear arms con-
trol, should engage on a broader range of strands for conflict manage-
ment. These include not only the additionally emphasized focus on
world order accountability in avoiding overt or covert aggressive attack,
but also enhancing diplomacy and diplomatic process, enhancing coor-
dinated democratic nations' efforts (and within the United States coor-
dinated Executive-Congressional efforts) at deterrence, sharpening the
72. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, 14 I.L.M. 1292,
73 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at A14 (reporting that NATO offered
compromises to reach an agreement with Warsaw Pact side before the Conference
deadline and that the Canadian delegate proposed raising the threshold for advance
notification of military maneuvers); N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1986, at A6 (noting that the
Soviet delegation said at the Stockholm Conference that it is willing to accept on-site
inspections of troop movements); Lewis, East and West Reported Near Accord on Se-
curity, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1986, at A5 (reporting that both NATO and Warsaw
Pact diplomats said that they were close to a pact that would prevent either side from
launching a surprise attack in Europe, although important issues remained unresolved).
See generally Borawski, Weens & Thompson, The Stockholm Agreement of Septem-
ber 1986, 30 ORalS 643 (1987) (providing a summation of the Stockholm Conference).
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laws of war (particularly in low-intensity warfare and possibly nuclear
targeting), strengthening international organizations, strengthening in-
ternational efforts against terrorism, enhancing third party dispute set-
tlement where effective for particular conflicts and enhancing non-nu-
clear arms control, particularly the core need for avoidance of
conventional imbalance. Direct negotiating linkage of any of these is-
sues with nuclear arms control (with the possible exception of MBFR
conventional balance issues74 and no-first-use) is probably not wise and
is not the point. The point is that failure to include fundamental world
order issues in East-West dialogue for accountability and improvement
is to reduce deterrence against such behavior and to fail to address a
fundamental world order linkage with effective arms control whether or
not linked directly in a negotiating sense. The Soviet battalion in
Cuba75 and more importantly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after
all, stopped the SALT II Treaty before it even got to the Senate to be
evaluated on its merits as an arms control agreement.
CONCLUSION
Nine out of the eleven summits between American and Soviet lead-
ers since World War II have focused centrally on nuclear arms con-
trol.76 This focus is illustrative of how the East-West agenda has been
dominated by nuclear arms control issues. It is, of course, understanda-
ble in view of the horror of nuclear weapons that we should have a
preoccupation with their control. It does not follow from this under-
standable preoccupation, however, that we are correct in assuming that
such a focus alone is the best way to secure the peace or even through
time to secure more effective arms control. There is a strong case that
the West should broaden the dialogue to include a full range of issues
important for securing the peace, with emphasis on an expanded arms
control agenda and accountability talks concerning strengthening the
fundamental Charter prohibition against aggressive attack." It might
be appropriate for the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of
State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Se-
curity Council, and a wide variety of university and specialized conflict
management programs to examine carefully the costs and benefits of
74. See D. SKAGGS, MR UPDATE: MBFR (1987) (discussing the Mutual and Bal-
anced Force Reduction Talks).
75. See D. FERNANDEZ, CUBA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1988)
(discussing the Soviet battalion in Cuba).
76. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, at DI (providing a chronology, beginning in
1955, of Summit Conferences between the United States and the Soviet Union).
77. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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such an enhanced and more vigorous Western engagement in the East-
West dialogue.
Whatever the merits of this proposal we must as a nation strengthen
serious scholarly study of conflict management in all its dimensions.
The University of Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Institute for the Study
of War, Peace, and Global Cooperation should be congratulated for
their dedication to that goal.
Thank you.
